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. . . learning how to become a parasite upon a text nobody reads passed on from
generation to generation.
Christine Brooke-Rose, 
Abstract Christine Brooke-Rose’s Thru is a strikingly provocative postmodernist
text. Instead of examining how Thru deconstructs ﬁction through the literary and
linguistic theory that it includes, this essay looks at how theory—speciﬁcally Roman
Jakobson’s diagram of communication—is altered within the context of ﬁction.The
analysis considers the mechanisms through which criticism diﬀerentiates itself from
reading and how Thru manages to expose such distinctions. I foreground the text’s
disrupted graphic surface in order to suggest that this may be the basis for the prag-
matic reader to gain the advantage over the critic in achieving a productive view of
this complex text.
Thru and Criticism
More than any other of her novels, Thru () is responsible for the per-
ception of Christine Brooke-Rose as a diﬃcult writer. Written in summer
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vacations from teaching structuralist narratology at the Université de Paris
à Vincennes, Thru may be seen as an attempt to try to resolve the tensions
between being a writer of ﬁction and becoming deeply involved with narra-
tology as a teacher.The result is thatThru both applies and plays with post-
structuralist theory (and several other varieties) and has been described
as ‘‘a novel about the theory of the novel, a ﬁction about ﬁctionality, a
non-narrative about narrativity, a text about intertextuality’’ (Brooke-Rose
a: ). Analyses of Thru tend to highlight either how the novel uses
critical theory to deconstruct literature (Little : , ; Berressem
) or, inversely, how ﬁction acts upon literary theory (Caserio : ;
Reyes : ).Whatwill particularly concernme here is how readers and
critics deal with a text in which literature and literary theory cross-fertilize
so vigorously.
I shall introduce the diﬃcultiesThru presents for critics by looking brieﬂy
at an example of worthwhile criticism. Rimmon-Kenan  was the ﬁrst
large-scale academic essay on this important text. A revised version, with
helpful alterations and expansions, appears as a chapter inRimmon-Kenan
: –. I admire Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan’s continued attention to
this text, which places Brooke-Rose in the worthy company of William
Faulkner, Vladimir Nabokov, Samuel Beckett, and Toni Morrison. I also
ﬁnd myself in sympathy with the basic intention, as I understand it, of
Rimmon-Kenan’s book.Unfortunately, however, the inclusion of themodi-
ﬁed essay in the book project aggravates what I ﬁnd to be a central ﬂaw in
the original article: the denial of anything other than self-reﬂexivity toThru.
Rimmon-Kenan (: ) announces the intent of A Glance beyond Doubt as
an ‘‘attempt to reinstate representation and rehumanize subjectivity,’’ and
certainly I do not dispute the necessity of literary criticism taking such a pro-
ductive approach.There is, however, a problem with the course Rimmon-
Kenan plots to show attitudes toward these issues in ﬁction. She follows
the development of ‘‘the Anglo-American novel of our century,’’ especially
those novels ‘‘that represent a theoretical avant-garde,’’ and her analyses
discover a ‘‘movement . . . generally analogous to the transition from mod-
ernism to postmodernism to a counter tendency within postmodernism’’
(ibid.: –).The point at which this model suggests that representation and
subjectivity ﬁzzle out, in the sequence Absalom, Absalom!, The Real Life of
Sebastian Knight, Thru, Company, and Beloved, is Thru. Although Rimmon-
Kenan warns that ‘‘such transitions are never clear cut’’ (ibid.), we read on
the next page that ‘‘Thru is clearly postmodernist’’ and, later (ibid.: ), that
‘‘Thru explicitly and playfully opts for a postmodernist position.’’
It would be futile to dispute this terminology: ifThru cannot be described
as a postmodernist text, nothing can. Brian McHale (: ) is right to
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assign to Thru ‘‘the full postmodernist repertoire of destabilising strategies’’
and to describe it as ‘‘a text of radical ontological hesitation: a paradig-
matic postmodern novel.’’ But to settle for this when faced by this text is
facile and reductive.Whether Thru is the epitome of postmodernism or of
deconstructive ﬁction, the novel itself still needs to be read.
The historicizing sweep of Rimmon-Kenan’s (: , ) argument
forces Thru to become the extreme point of a postmodernity that is intent
on ‘‘dismantling representation’’ and that ‘‘dissociates voices from any origi-
nating self.’’ However, when Rimmon-Kenan (ibid.: ) argues that in her
chosen texts ‘‘the problem of representation is dramatizedmainly through a
manipulation of narrative levels’’ and that the ‘‘problemof subjectivity takes
the form of undecidability concerning the narrator’s identity and structural
position vis-à-vis the events narrated,’’ her argument is at odds with her own
attempt to historicize a development, since the problems and the forms of
their examination are the same in all those texts. Moreover, at least for me,
the problem of representation is present in every text, and that of subjec-
tivity is raised by all narration.
Postmodernism is not a special case. Neither of these problems ever goes
away, for they are implicit in () language, which has to refer (the referen-
tial function of Jakobson’s diagram, below), and () a reader, who needs to
attribute the discourse (see Foucault  []). Representation is neces-
sary to ﬁction, and subjectivity is always an issue for a human recipient. I
prefer a view of postmodernism closer to that of PatriciaWaugh (: ) in
Metaﬁction, which construes the devices of literary postmodernity as a ‘‘ten-
dency or function inherent in all novels.’’ 1 The diﬀerences Rimmon-Kenan
notices among her texts are not, then, a development as such but depend
on the rigor and complexity with which these texts address the same issues.
The intention in the following is not to attack the thesis of A Glance beyond
Doubt. If anything, dispelling the historicity of Rimmon-Kenan’s argument
suggests that her central themes are indeed universal in narrative. Instead,
I intend to prove two points: () that even in a narrative that may be seen as
‘‘constructing itself and then destroying itself as it goes along’’ (Hayman and
Cohen : ), there are elements that attempt to deliver representation
in new ways (rather than just problematizing the old ways) and () that the
novel’s self-conscious problematization of readerly hypothesizing demands
a reader that directly contradicts Rimmon-Kenan’s (: , ) idea that
Thru, by using ‘‘metalanguage as its object-language,’’ somehow manages
the ‘‘transformation of the reader into an element of the text.’’
. Ultimately, however, while valuing the lessons oﬀered by Thru,Waugh (: –) sug-
gests that this novel is a limit text of postmodernism.
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The Jakobson Diagram Lesson
I shall begin my discussion of Thru by reproducing part of a signiﬁcant pas-
sage that illustrates the key problems surrounding the analysis of this text.2
By setting itself in academic environments in which both literary theory
and creative writing are taught, the novel establishes—at least partly—
a mimetic domain for their hybridization. The Jakobson diagram lesson
(Brooke-Rose : –)3 is my designation for a passage in which a class
and tutor discuss ‘‘the economy of the narrative’’ (ibid.: ) and which
includes the eponymous diagram. Although the dialogue is neither marked
as speech nor attributed to particular characters throughout the novel, we
can discern a pedagogic voice against student voices here, and the voice
that introduces the diagram itself is plainly that of the teacher (see Figure ).
It is not diﬃcult to understand that this passage represents a seminar
on literary theory, but the devil is in the detail of how it is represented.
Perhaps the most noticeable thing about the passage is that the diagram
itself functions at a representational level. In other words, the diagram
replaces a representational description of the interaction of the tutor with
the board (or overhead projector). Instead, we, the readers, see a textual
representation of what the class sees, that is, the diagram itself. The way
the diagram is presented to the reader is an example of what Brooke-Rose
() has called ‘‘naive mimesis.’’ This representation directly contrasts
with Rimmon-Kenan’s (: ) view ofThru as ‘‘non-representational.’’ It
is true that the content of this piece of representation, a literary theoretical
intertext, immediately complicates (or oﬀers an alternative to) our under-
standing of it as simple graphicmimesis, but this is exactly the crux ofThru’s
poeticization of poetics. By representing a class that believes itself to oper-
ate at a level above language, Thru creates a situation in which the diagram
is part of the referential and the poetic functions, not part of ametalinguistic
critical discourse, although it invokes such a discourse.
This creates diﬃculties for the reader in hierarchizing the narrative,
and these diﬃculties are compounded because the scene problematizes any
attempt to attribute narration. It is not clear which member of the central
couple of the text, Armel and Larissa, is the teacher of this class (leaving
aside the possibility of each being narrated by the other) or whether they
(either one) are teachers of a class in a narrative written by a creative writ-
ing class. For example, one character in the text surmises that ‘‘it is clear
. Thoughwe ﬁnd it hard to place sections ofThru’s narrative in any hierarchical order, there
are clearly recognizable ‘‘scenes.’’
. The text is more readily available now in an omnibus edition (Brooke-Rose ). The
Jakobson diagram lesson occurs on pages –. Other references within this essay to Thru
may be converted for use with the omnibus edition by adding .
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A very good point. But we mustn’t confuse the levels of discourse. My function here
is not to narrate but to teach, or shall we say I am not a function of your narrative,
and we are using a metalanguage, so:
      
(referential function)
  
                     
(emotive f.) (poetic function) (conative f.)
      
(phatic function)
   
(metalinguistic f.)
  
(Unless you have gotten imprisoned in M)
There should be placards saying: Danger. You are now entering the Metalinguis-
tic Zone. All access forbidden except for Prepared Consumers with special permits
from the Authorities.
M-phatically.
Figure 1
that Larissa is producing a text. But which text? It looks mightily as if she
were producing this one and not, as previously appeared, Armel, or Armel
disguised as narrator or the narrator I disguised as Armel. That’s not very
clear’’ (Brooke-Rose : ). In other words, like the reader, characters
in the text ﬁnd that ‘‘any discussion about whether to return to Armel (or
to Larissa) as subject of discourse drifts into the undeicidable’’ [sic] (ibid.:
). And the same problem applies to the possibility of the creative writ-
ing class as joint narrators. At some points they threaten to kill oﬀ Larissa
and/or Armel but at others seem to be taught by one (or the other) of them,
and later they argue that: ‘‘this is the text we are creating it verbally we are
the text we do not exist we are a pack of lies dreamt up by the unreliable
narrator in love with the zeroist author in love with himself but absent in
the nature of things, an etherised unauthorised other’’ (ibid.: ).
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Because all these examples come from within the text, and in two cases
are clearly dialogue, such pronouncements are metaphorically (if not lit-
erally) in quotation marks, open to question. Potential reversals of nar-
ration are oﬀered throughout Thru and are foregrounded by the question
‘‘Who Speaks?,’’ borrowed fromRoland Barthes ( []: ), occurring
repeatedly, and in several diﬀerent languages, throughout the text (ﬁfteen
times according to Grant : ).We simply cannot tell whether Armel
or Larissa or both are central characters as such or central characters within
an internal narrative (or, somehow, simultaneously both).4
Thus there is no clear-cut central consciousness or narrator ﬁgure for
the reader to focus upon and create a center from which to hierarchize the
narrative (‘‘we’re building our house on quicksands’’ [Brooke-Rose :
]).Unlike the narrating translator character of Brooke-Rose’s Between, in
whose mind the various languages interact, or the damaged astrophysicist
of Such, or even the dialogic narration of Jip and Zab typing into the same
computer ﬁle inXorandor, there seems to be noway for the reader to attribute
the text he or she is reading to an identiﬁable source within that text. This
supports Rimmon-Kenan’s (: ) contention that ‘‘Thru links narrators
with indeterminacy and dissociates voices from any originating self.’’
That we cannot positively attribute the text here to a particular narrator
or point of view means there is no comfortable barrier of a mediator with
the text. As a result, we cannot be quite sure how we are to read the dia-
gram, by which I mean that the diagram clearly represents the subject of
the ﬁctional class, but the ﬁctional class can also be seen as a message and
thus as subject to the diagram. In as much as we enter the text while read-
ing, the Jakobson diagram scene does have the eﬀect of seeming to place
us in the class, even if only as a disconcerted ﬂy on the wall, but the subject
matter of that class suggests we ought to look at the act of communication
from the outside.These options are not evidence, however, that Thru traps
the reader in the text, only that it makes it more diﬃcult for the reader to
orient himself or herself within it. The question of self-orientation for the
reader relates signiﬁcantly to how we discuss the reader-text relationship.
Is Thru a trap or a challenge?
The positioning of the reader and the capacity we allow him or her for
dealing with the diﬃculties that the text poses is the most signiﬁcant prob-
lem to come out of this scene and the novel as a whole. My position, which
will be stated brieﬂy here, depends on a concept of a determined and adapt-
able reader. In Thru, conventional narration is stripped away and replaced
with something not less butmore representational; a technique Brooke-Rose
. See also Rimmon-Kenan : – and : – for her fuller account of Thru’s
narratorial instability.
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() has described as ‘‘absolutely objective narration,’’ that is, narration
that has no self-conscious awareness of the act of narrating. Compare the
way the ‘‘naive mimesis’’ implicit in the direct re-presentation of the Jakob-
son diagram has no consciousness of its textuality, unlike a more conven-
tional inclusion of the diagramas a ﬁgure (as in this text).The ‘‘un-narrated’’
situations in Thru depend on the reader to hold them together, and in this
experience of constructing meaning from complex, contradictory signals
the reader is close to our own everyday experience.5 In other words, the text
is not simply, or ultimately, self-reﬂexive but also to some degree mimetic.
By mimesis here I mean something quite speciﬁc rather than a synonym for
realism.
In the term’s ﬁrst usage, Book  ofRepublic, Plato discusses themorality of
‘‘poetry’’ (epic poetry/drama) and ﬁnds it wanting. He deﬁnes the epic form
as a combination of ‘‘pure’’ narrative, that coming from the narrator, which
he calls ‘‘diegesis,’’ and imitative narrative, in which the voice of a charac-
ter is represented by the author: this he calls ‘‘mimesis’’ and disapproves of
(Plato : –). Plato’s second use of the term, inBook , via a painting
metaphor, has ‘‘mimesis’’ standing for representation as a whole (diegetic
and mimetic), and this is the more commonly accepted usage. Once again
‘‘mimesis’’ is found to be morally wanting, being only the two-dimensional
representation of a representation of a divine ideal.
It strikes me that it might be useful to retain the deﬁnition of mimesis as
‘‘impure’’ imitation found inBook , not for dialogue alone, but for any liter-
ary device that acts by imitation on the representational eﬃcacy of the text.
For the larger ‘‘mimesis’’ of Book , it seems adequate to substitute ‘‘repre-
sentation.’’ In making this distinction between representation and mimesis,
I assign no advantage, moral or otherwise, to one over the other; mimesis
is simply a new, and still unacceptable, version of representation, whatever
particular period it appears in. This mimesis is the type of representation
that Thru oﬀers its readers.
The following section attempts to theorize how such techniques might
be assimilated.
Narrative Levels and Metatexts
We have already mentioned narrative levels and the process of hierarchiz-
ing the narrative (putting levels in place) in relation to Thru. But it needs to
be understood that such maneuvers bear no relation to the actual text. As
Umberto Eco (: ) states: ‘‘The notion of textual level is a very embar-
. Brooke-Rose has stated in an interview about Thru, perhaps optimistically: ‘‘people will
say, ‘how do you expect your reader to follow this?’ But I’m surprised that readers ﬁnd this
diﬃcult. They all live like this’’ (Hayman and Cohen : –).
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rassing one. Such as it appears, in its linear manifestation, a text has no
levels at all. . . . Therefore the notion of textual level is merely theoretical;
it belongs to semiotic metalanguage.’’ In literature there are no levels, there
is only text: ‘‘Levels do not exist: our sense of them is the result of an allu-
sive juxtaposition of registers’’ (Sage : ). Our excuse for using these
critical ﬁctions is not convention, though they are seldom questioned, but
necessity.We shall return to the implications of this critical necessity in the
next section, but for the moment I want to interrogate the concept of the
‘‘allusive juxtaposition of registers’’ that texts generate.
In her critical work on The Turn of the Screw, Christine Brooke-Rose
(: ) rejects narrative grammar, for both its ‘‘false analogy’’ with sen-
tence grammar and in particular its ‘‘deep structure,’’ because she feels that
‘‘deep’’ somehow implies it is ‘‘more profound in an evaluative sense.’’ She
then goes on to state: ‘‘I shall however retain the notion of levels of structure,
for they seem indispensable’’ (ibid.). In practice, the levels Brooke-Rose
uses are surface structure, meaning presentation of events and sequence
of words, and metatexts, which are divided into authorial and narratorial
metatexts:
Although the surface structure is the narrator’s (ﬁctional) responsibility, there
will naturally be an author’s metatext (AM), which indirectly tells the reader
things the narrator does not state directly. And in the case of a dramatized and
self-conscious narrator like the governess, there will also be a narrator’s metatext
(NM) on her own narrative. (Ibid.: )
In practice it proves diﬃcult to distinguish between AM and NM. Later
Brooke-Rose (ibid.: ) oﬀers an insightful answer to this problem: ‘‘Meta-
text is always essentially the reader’s text; it depends on the reader’s atten-
tion . . . and can therefore vary a good deal, not only in degree, but in
speciﬁc judgments as to whether information implied comes direct from the
author or is ﬁltered through the narrator’s consciousness.’’
There are a number of points to note here. Brooke-Rose’s metatexts are
diﬃcult to distinguish because the text leaves the distinction to the reader.
In any case, as Barthes would argue, the reader is the creator of meaning in
the text, and the whole text is ‘‘the reader’s,’’ but Brooke-Rose is deﬁning
particular metatexts that work by implying information (the ‘‘allusive reg-
isters’’). Properly, these metatexts are a complex function of the language
of a particular text that, though only implied textually, goes directly to the
reader’s hypothesizing activity.6
. A nonliterary but pertinent example: in reading this critical essay you are constructing
metatexts about me insofar as you believe me to exist—about my intellect, education, inﬂu-
ences, and my use of notes.
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Jacques the Fatalist andHisMaster, byDenisDiderot, an important intertext
within Thru, suggests some ways in which metatexts operate. For example,
Jacques’s fatalism is described as ‘‘everything which happens to us on this
earth, both good and bad,’’ is ‘‘written up above’’ (Diderot  []: ),
but the idea of ‘‘written up above’’ is cunningly used by the authorial nar-
rator within Jacques the Fatalist. Instead of specifying where Jacques and
his master spend a certain night, Diderot (ibid.: ) presents a long series
of options to the reader, ending with: ‘‘Although all of these might appear
equally feasible to you, Jacques was not of this opinion.The only possibility
was the one that was written up above.’’ There is in this phrase both the sug-
gestion of the godlike powers of an heavenly author and a pun on ‘‘above’’
as a literary convention for ‘‘aforementioned,’’ but the eﬀect of this short
passage as a whole suggests a number of possible hypotheses to the reader.
We might just read the idea of ‘‘written up above’’ quite literally as
emphasizing how Jacques (a character within the ﬁction) believes in the
heavenly writing, which would illustrate his fatalism and even a little piety.
This reading would belong to a character-based metatext. The reader
could, on the other hand, take a longer view, understanding Jacques as a
ﬁction and focusing on the way the authorial narrator implies, relatively
directly, that he is privy to the information about Jacques’s lodging because
the reader depends on his authorship for the story, thus emphasizing his
own godlike powers. This would belong to one member of Brooke-Rose’s
diﬃcult-to-distinguish pair, AM and NM, depending on how we under-
stood the authorial ﬁgure in the text.
There is, however, also the possibility of the reader making an almost
wholly metatextual reading, in which Jacques would be taken to know, or
to suspect to some degree, that he is a character in a ﬁction. As criticism of
Diderot’s work suggests, ‘‘the real problem [in Jacques the Fatalist] is where
the creator really comes out into the open, revealing himself with the total
freedom he really has, a freedom over a character who, in these circum-
stances, can only be a fatalist’’ (Bremner : ). We recognize that, as
a character in a ﬁction, Jacques is helpless in the matter of his own des-
tiny and that as such he is ironized by the author character; but there is
another, more subtle, metatext here. This metatext depends on the persis-
tence of the characters despite the exposure of their ﬁctional position. In
Jacques’s case, because of the applicability of his personal doctrine, there
is the sneaking feeling that he might suspect the unreality of his situation: ‘‘I
have noticed several times that there’s something sly about Destiny’’ (Dide-
rot  []: ). This metatext generates a rivalry between the author
ﬁgure and his chief character, which ﬁts well with the play on roles of mas-
ter and servant in Jacques the Fatalist but which, as metatext and particularly
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as ‘‘the reader’s text,’’ is diﬃcult to evidence from the text on the page.7The
stability of such metatexts is remarkably fragile; an alternative hypothesis
generated by the same evidence would suggest that the author character
was tantalizing the reader by placing such potentially metatextual obser-
vations in the mouth of a helpless character.
Such passages can thus be interpreted in a variety of diﬀerent ways simul-
taneously, and from the rub between them the reader accumulates meta-
texts. The important point is that the reader is capable of reading a com-
plex set of possibilities that might logically be mutually exclusive but that
in practice are not. We can, as readers, maintain textual and metatextual
readings at the same time.
As I. A. Richards (: ) states in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, while
refuting the doctrine of the association of ideas, human thought cannot be
reduced to a single track: ‘‘We can all detect a diﬀerence in our own minds
between thinking of a dog and thinking of a cat. . . . We can also say ‘dog’
and think ‘cat.’ ’’ Similarly, the human brain, by which a reader functions,
will be able, unless severely debilitated, to deal with a narrative paradox
(by suspending its possible outcomes). Readerly metatexts, happening in
the reader, not the text, oﬀer a more ﬂexible conception of reading than
that available in ‘‘narrative levels.’’
Rimmon-Kenan (: ) describes Thru’s logical disjunctions as ‘‘ren-
dering level and metalevel perpetually reversible.’’ But I do not agree
that this reversibility has the eﬀect of ‘‘blocking all possible resolution’’
(Rimmon-Kenan : ): it merely suspends the need to resolve aspects
of the text. In my opinion, the reader cannot be trapped at a particular
level in the text precisely because of their perpetual reversibility. The diﬀer-
ence between blocking and suspending is not merely verbal; for example,
the character of Armel is represented as black at some points in the text
(Brooke-Rose : –, –) and not black at others (speciﬁcally
denied in ibid.: ; see also Brooke-Rose b: ). This indeterminacy
does not stop us understanding that he has a relationship with Larissa,
though hemight be her ex-husband or a new suitor or both (‘‘a coincidence.
They do happen despite the critics’’ [Brooke-Rose : ]). The reader
is not trapped inside the text by rigid, monolithic, computerized logic: we
can accept a paradox and negotiate it according to our preferred metatext.
Our reader is by no means hamstrung by the reversibility or contradiction
between levels, which Rimmon-Kenan eﬀectively demonstrates in the text.
. To this extent, Diderot’s novel is unlike Thru, in which many characters talk about narra-
tion and claim it for themselves, including versions of Jacques and the master that are versed
in narratology.
White • ‘‘YOU ARE HERE’’ 621
Metalanguage and Graphic Space
An awareness of potential metatexts encourages the reader to read less lit-
erally, less linearly, to see possible meanings outside the literary straight
and narrow.Thus we have the opportunity to take the tutor’s statement that
introduces the Jakobson diagram intoThru (‘‘My function here is not to nar-
rate but to teach, or shall we say I am not a function of your narrative, and
we are using a metalanguage’’) at face value or, alternatively, of reading it
ironically and metatextually. Earlier in the lesson sequence we read:
There’s a diametrical opposition between the function of an element—what it
is used for—and its motivation—what is necessary to conceal the function. As
Genette puts it, the prince de Clèves does not die because his gentilhomme
behaves like a fool, though that is how it seems, his gentilhomme behaves like a
fool so that the prince de Clèves can die. (Brooke-Rose : )
With this principle it is quite possible for the reader to reverse the statement
that introduces the diagram.Applying such a reversal, we end upwith: ‘‘My
function is to narrate, not to teach; I am a function of your narrative; we are
not using metalanguage.’’ The ﬁrst clause relates to the possibility that we
are receiving the scene through the teacher’s narration—that he or she is a
narrator, not ‘‘just’’ a character.The second clause, which does not exclude
the ﬁrst, has the narrator again deny characterhood, and by implication,
it attributes the narrative (‘‘your narrative’’) either to the class or to the
reader. The third clause would seem to throw into question everything we
have already drawn from the reversed statement. In short, it problematizes
metalanguage and simultaneously oﬀers it a challenge in which the ‘‘we’’ is
no longer straightforwardly the class but could be any of several conﬁgura-
tions of character, narrator, class, and reader. As soon as the text’s actual
statement ‘‘we are using metalanguage’’ appears, readers are required to
consider further the implications of the inclusion of this theoretical diagram
in a ﬁctional narrative. I have already argued that the diagram performs
a representational function, but at this point I want to elaborate on how
the presence of the diagram might inform a metatext about criticism in
the novel.
A diagram almost identical to the one on page  ofThru can be found on
page  ofRhetoric of the Unreal, Brooke-Rose’smajor critical work on science
ﬁction and fantasy. This book was published in , and the section that
includes this diagramwas ﬁrst published in  under the title ‘‘Round and
Round the Jakobson Diagram.’’ The diagram itself is a conﬂation of two
diagrams used in Jakobson’s essay ‘‘Linguistics andPoetics’’ ().8Brooke-
. Reprinted in Chatman and Levin , which, interestingly, also contains a sequence of
extracts from Brooke-Rose’s ﬁrst critical book, A Grammar of Metaphor ().
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Rose’sRhetoric of the Unreal illustrates how diﬀerent schools of literary theory
have concentrated on, or become trapped within, diﬀerent areas of the dia-
gram. She suggests that, while traditional criticism combines study of the
emitter and context (or the emotive and referential functions), New Criti-
cism excludes everything but the poetic function. Reader theory naturally
concentrates upon the receptor and the conative function, while transfor-
mational grammarians concern themselves with the metalinguistic code.
Structuralism, she suggests, homes in on the poetic function with elements
of the emitter and receptor being used in some later schemes. Positioning
various schools in relation to the diagram may be interesting, but Brooke-
Rose’s intention in Rhetoric of the Unreal seems to be to point out that the
functions are not alternatives and an approach to ﬁction should encompass
them all (see also Brooke-Rose a: –). Returning to the Jakobson
diagram in Stories, Theories and Things, Brooke-Rose (: , ) points out
those parts of it most commonly neglected.The failure of criticism to deal
with the plural functions of written language, despite the strong inﬂuence
of Jakobson on much modern literary theory, is not seen as a symptom of
this diagram but as a diﬃculty caused by the instrument we use to deal with
language: language itself.
In Xorandor, Brooke-Rose (: ) puts Kurt Gödel’s theorem in the
mouth of one of her teenage narrators, Zab: ‘‘In any powerful logical system
things can be formulated that can’t be proved or disproved inside the same
system’’ (see also Derrida : ). The assumptions underlying literary,
linguistic, and philosophical theory all rely on language. The problem is,
how is it possible to talk about language, speech, or writing without some
means of focus, and consequently some amount of setting aside? And this
problem for criticism mirrors a problem for the writer who considers that
writing always sets aside or excises part of the totality of experience.
Thru’s treatment of theoretical diagrams and other representations of
texts by critics in diagrams and tablesmay be comparedwith Brooke-Rose’s
(: –) arguments against critical paraphrase inRhetoric of the Unreal.9
This novel opposes itself to any schema that presumes to reduce the com-
plexity of narrative: such critical maneuvers remove the narrative text even
further away from the complexity of actual experience that the narrative
has failed to encompass.
Jakobson is not held individually culpable, and several other theorists
(A. J. Greimas, Noam Chomsky, even Vladimir Propp when he cannot get
. The absurdity of such reductions is perfectly demonstrated in Sterne  [–]:
–. There diagrammatic lines are oﬀered as summaries of plot and digression, every
deviation from the ‘‘cabbage-planter’s line’’ of linear plot recorded as a loop or curve.
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Figure 2
all folktales to follow a single linear pattern) are satirized to some degree
in Thru. The point is simply that in order to somehow encompass his
material—in this case, the communicative act, which includes prose text—
Jakobson maneuvers out of the ‘‘linear manifestation’’ of prose text (Eco
: ) and into the diagram.
The diagrammatic form is shown to be a textual device that operates in
the same manner as text on the page. Diagrams and prose text are read
in the same graphic space. In the normal reading of prose, our eyes eﬀec-
tively move left to right for each line on the page, and the process is similar
when we read across diagrams, although they are likely to be less visually
repetitive. When referring to the Jakobson diagram in Stories, Theories and
Things, Brooke-Rose herself treats it as a compass dial: the text central, the
author West, the reader East, the world North, the remaining functions at
various latitudes South. This last is the direction in which our reading of
the diagram eventually requires us to head, but our progress through the
graphic space of the diagram is stopped in its tracks with a phrase familiar
from maps of all kinds accompanied by an arrow (see Figure ).
This demonstrates the graphic space of the page by directing us across
it, backward, against the normal ﬂow of reading, which moves recursively
down the page.10 If the Jakobson diagramwere amap, wewould begin read-
ing it at YOU ARE HERE, but in this context, when it appears as part
of a prose text, we begin at top left of the page. Logically, a tutor’s com-
ment on the diagram ‘‘(Unless you have gotten imprisoned inM),’’ phrased
like speech, follows it visually and temporally.The diagonal arrow, wemust
conclude, is either drawn by the tutor in the class or is simply a (diagram-
matic) representation of a gesture on his or her part.
The caveat ‘‘(Unless you have gotten imprisoned in M)’’ is a joke, since
to reach YOU ARE HERE we must have escaped M for message in the
diagram, and similarly we must have gone beyond the arrow that returns
us to reach the caveat itself. Our reading continues despite these attempts
to divert us. The metatextual joke on Jakobson is that, although we have
. AsThru notes, simultaneously punning withChomskyean terminology: ‘‘This structure is
generated by recursivity rules which in English tend to be to the right, as in French, whereas
Japanese favours recursivity to the left’’ (Brooke-Rose : –).
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escaped M in the diagram, we remain very much in M in the narrative.
Because this is a novel, we cannot escape to a metalinguistic level, we are in
language; and furthermore, because linguistics is in itself language, there
is a strong suggestion that we can never escape to the metalinguistic level.
This is because levels, as I have pointed out, do not exist in the text. They
are instead ametatext we impose on the text to structure ‘‘the allusive juxta-
position of registers.’’
Jakobson’s (: ) own use of his diagram tended to place only poetry
in the poetic function, while the novel is associatedwith the referential func-
tion through the following argument: ‘‘We could . . . hardly ﬁnd verbal
messages that would fulﬁl only one function. The diversity lies not in the
monopoly of some one of these several functions but in a diﬀerent hierar-
chical order of functions.’’ In other words, having developed a diagram of
the entire communicative act, he proceeded to narrow his focus. Jakobson’s
treatment of his diagram recalls how the literary critic presents metatex-
tual levels as belonging to the text and attempts (usually successfully) to
hierarchize them.
This critical imposition is, of necessity, strongly defended: ‘‘Poetry and
metalanguage . . . are in diametrical opposition to one another: in meta-
language the sequence is used to build an equation, whereas in poetry the
equation is used to build a sequence’’ (ibid.: ). But after Thru has com-
bined literary representation and critical diagrams in the same text and the
same graphic space, it becomes fairly clear that ‘‘equation’’ and ‘‘sequence’’
are both ultimately sequences, with the diﬀerence that the former associ-
ates itself with the science of mathematics rather than linguistics. For this
reason I do not believe it is possible to use the ‘‘placards’’ to distinguish the
linguistic and the metalinguistic within narrative in the way the close of the
Jakobson lesson suggests. I suspect that, thoughThru claims they have been
omitted, mention of them is the closest we can come to such signs since,
as the use of the Jakobson diagram here shows, it is impossible to fence in
narrative with theoretical metalanguage.
The ﬂoating narrative ofThru, with its unreliable, ungendered narrators,
who may be writing about the class or being written by the class, provides
the context in which ‘‘YOU ARE HERE’’ is an ironic joke. This simple
phrase works at three metatextual levels: () as a representation of tutorial
comment, () as comment on the eﬀectiveness of diagrams in criticism (see
also Brooke-Rose : ), and () as a pointer to a position on the graphic
surface of the page. At this point I would like to emphasize the third of
these, which might initially seem like the most trivial metatext imaginable
but which in Thru takes on a particular signiﬁcance.When everything else
is unstable, it is about as much as we can say that we are reading through
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the graphic space at any one point. But we recognize simultaneously that
this is not a point of rest.We have to move on. Thru’s lack of conventional
chapters or any kind of sequential breaks means that there are no places of
rest within the text at all; we have to keep moving through Thru.11 But the
text remains for us to return to, even the ‘‘scrapped’’ chapters (those sec-
tions of narrative voted out by the creativewriting group, such as Salvatore’s
sequence [ibid.: –]).
This continuation of the novel as process and artifact is what lies behind
the joke at the end of the section featuring the diagram: ‘‘M-phatically.’’
Because Thru is a novel, it is M for message, emphatically. The use of this
diagram is referential, poetic, and to a certain degree, metalinguistic, but
the emphasized ‘‘M-’’ reminds us that all these are part of themessage.12The
second part of ‘‘M-phatically’’ ‘‘M-phasizes’’ the phatic role, the continua-
tion of contact, the prolongation of the message with or without content.
Clearly the gap before the next paragraph is part of the text and part of the
message too.This is the eﬀect of an awareness of the graphic surface, which
is themediumof contact for printed texts. It forms solid ground fromwhich,
I would suggest, all metatexts are built (and it is not a metalanguage).
Readers and Critics
In A Glance beyond Doubt, Rimmon-Kenan (: ) suggests that ‘‘Thru
uses the reader’s (or critic’s) metalanguage as its own object language, sub-
verting the distinction between the two.’’ I would dispute this statement.
Although ‘‘the two’’ Rimmon-Kenan refers to here are metalanguage and
object language, the sentence can also be seen to subvert the distinction
between critic and reader, which is the tendency of her argument but very
far from the eﬀect of Thru: it is primarily the critic’s metalanguage that is
Thru’s object language, and it is the critic who is preempted by the text and
has no way to escape. Others (Fowler  []:  andMaack : )
have argued that reader and critic are necessarily the same for this text; but
I believe that, even when critic and reader may be embodied in one per-
son, they do not construct the same metatexts. A particular reader may or
may not have access to the same metalanguage as the critic, but in either
case the reader has less theoretical baggage and more freedom to ﬁnd a
. There are some unexpected, unnumbered gaps in the text, butmost of these can be attrib-
uted to the text’s construction in blocks, so that an acrostic page is a unit. The narrative
generally continues without rest.
. As a critic, Brooke-Rose (: ) sensibly suggests that ‘‘no reader or critic can see all
aspects at the same time’’ and opts for an eclectic approach that adapts to the particular text
being studied.
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way around the text’s undecidability. The reader’s role is trying to ﬁgure
a way through the text in order to continue reading, not to build or main-
tain a critical project or overview. As Hanjo Berressem (: ) states in
response toThru, ‘‘The critic is therefore referred back to his or her function
as a reader.’’ Metalanguage is a coded metatext, potentially a plural one,
as Thru shows by the breadth of theory it includes, but it is not suﬃciently
plural to contain all the reader’s possible metatexts.
Thru’s literary-theoretical intertextuality does make it diﬃcult to dis-
tinguish reading from critical reading when the language, and supposed
metalanguage, of the critic is already appropriated by the text. Critics may
attempt to fall back on what they know (literary theory), but critics do not
necessarily know literary theory in its playful and parodic manifestations
in Thru. Thru reverses the hierarchy implied in Rimmon-Kenan (reader as
somewhat inferior to the critic) because the determined reader (critic or
not) can adapt to this text that resists critical dominance and introduces,
and exposes, literary theory throughout.
In Thru, critical metalanguage is sabotaged, poetics has become poeti-
cized, yet the reader (which is what even critics are ultimately) is capable of
carrying on, of reading.This activity cannot be explained away or trapped
or killed oﬀ in the way that literary theory has dealt with the Author.
(Indeed, Barthes’s essay ‘‘The Death of the Author’’ [: ] ends with
‘‘the birth of the reader.’’) The whole point ofThru is that narrative and lan-
guage, the dialogue between text and reader, are inherently stronger and
more essential than criticism, which, although it claims the status of meta-
language, is only another narrative, another set of stories, supplementary
to an original text.
Thru sometimes ﬁgures this relationship as an impossible reader/writer
romance (‘‘the reader is the writer and the writer the reader’’ [Brooke-Rose
: ]), but this is predicated, through the text’s instability, on the emo-
tional entanglements between the characters.When Larissa asks algebraist
Professor/Count La Bocca to help her with a ‘‘three-dimensional graph’’
of internal (narrative) and external (reader) time in a text, their collabo-
ration fails: ‘‘the true implication being perhaps her retrospective realiza-
tion that she has worked on something inﬁnitely beyond her and beyond
you too, so that you want to break up this communion of false premises
with your uncomplicated desire which has been quietly generated for some
time’’ (ibid.: ).The second-person ‘‘you’’ here may be read as referring to
Stavro, Larissa’s lover of the moment, but it might also be taken as a meta-
textual ‘‘you’’ addressing the reader.The ‘‘uncomplicated desire’’ then shifts
from character’s sexual desire to reader’s textual desire. Where criticism
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fails to encompass the communicative act by diagram, narrative commu-
nicates its intimate, collaborative nature by metaphor.13
Conclusion
The use of Jakobson’s diagram illustrates how Thru never allows us to get
our bearings, to settle for one reading over another, and—the crucial point
that Rimmon-Kenan denies—to exclude a mimetic reading. I agree that
such passages are intertextual and metatextual (Rimmon-Kenan : )
and that Thru mixes the levels of discourse, but I do not think any of these
function as ‘‘an alternative to representation’’ (ibid.: ). The assumption
that language does not represent needs to be avoided. Brooke-Rose (:
), for one, has vehemently disputed this assumption—as she puts it:
‘‘realism of a kind is essential to all ﬁctional modes.’’ And this can be stated
in such an axiomatic way because language itself is representational.
Although in parts ofThru ‘‘textuality is . . . playfully ‘performed’ by high-
lighting various aspects of ‘the materiality of the sign’ ’’ (Rimmon-Kenan
: ), such materiality is not an alternative to representation—it is
representation. For example, some of the more obviously nontraditional
narrative sequences in the text, particularly distortions of the conventional
graphic surface, are realistically motivated. Examples would be the eyes
and nose in the driving mirror textually represented on page  of the novel,
the rectangular driving mirror (, ), the bridge (), the dancing hoops
(–), the classroom desks (), and the much disputed arc icons (, ).
It is more useful to look at how these add to the text’s ‘‘residue of realism’’
(Rimmon-Kenan : ) and ask what is demanded of readers in order
to assimilate these eﬀects.
In using these devices, Thru simultaneously celebrates and satirizes the
possibilities of the print medium, attempting to open up the conventional
boundaries. It is important to recognize thatThru’s complexity is motivated
by representation, and the novel uses the representational medium of lan-
guage in new ways—some verbal, some graphic—to this end. The ways
in which this representation functions are new and, I believe, comprehen-
sible but have not yet been found acceptable for one reason or another.
Plato disqualiﬁed mimesis on moral grounds; Rimmon-Kenan (: )
presumably downplays Thru’s ‘‘perverse mimeticism’’ because of its non-
postmodernity. Extracted from context, individual examples of graphic
. Kafelanos  is good on the textual/sexual relationship between Armel and Larissa
but, unfortunately I feel, ties them to intellectual and emotional aspects of the author.
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mimesis have been critically described by Waugh (: ) as illustrat-
ing the ‘‘naive imitative fallacy’’; but included within the ongoing text of a
novel, they are far less easy to dismiss. Many critics have noted the acros-
tic pages in Thru on which text can be read vertically, horizontally, and
sometimes diagonally (, , ), but no critic had (or has since) written
about the hidden text available to be read vertically in some of the non-
acrostic pages of Thru (–, –, –). In these pages we can ﬁnd
words, phrases, and sentences that can be read vertically composed of the
leftmost (or rightmost [–]) letters of each line. For example, an early
scene between two lovers has the following sexual vertical ‘‘side text’’: ‘‘TWo
white thighsDO it twoWhite legswoYOudadDYbitcHYOUTITBITCH
you got IT ALL wrong’’ (–). But even this unique device is mimetic,
revealing what characters think against what they say (see Brooke-Rose
b: ).14Thewhole point of the complex graphicmimesis used inThru
is that it attempts to encompass as much as possible, to be as complex as
possible.
That the novel’s ambiguities do not resolve themselves and that they
penetrate all the narrative levels we can invent does not, I would argue,
make the text necessarily nonmimetic. Our perceptions of the world are
partial, our understandings diﬀerent and, in short, subjective. This is the
product of both awealth of information and our freedom to interpret.Thru,
in producing the experience of ‘‘perpetual reversibility’’ that must be lim-
ited by the reader, is producing a mimetic eﬀect, though of a metatextual
kind. This ‘‘metatextual mimesis’’ goes further than the readerly attempt
to see meaning or meaninglessness in textual detail and involves the inter-
pretative experience of ambiguity and unresolvability and the necessary
pragmatic solutions to such diﬃculties.
Thru is inspired by the ideas that criticism is just another narrative and
that the reader is more important than the critic in interpretation. With
its sabotaged jargon, unresolved ambiguities, new mimetic, and innovative
devices,Thru is not an example of ‘‘foolproof composition’’ (Sternberg :
); but its confusion and complexity validate reading despite everything. In
the absence of ‘‘foolproof composition,’’ I invoke a fail-safe device for inter-
preting such a book: the pragmatic reader, whose object is not the line of
least resistance but the best reading available.The options thatThru gives us
as readers (and the fact that we do have options) represent the relationship
of the individual to reality (even if we wish to characterize it as a plethora of
. A case might be made for the embedded vertical text of Thru being some kind of meta-
language. See White : –.
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narratives) better than any text that gives, or attempts to give, a single uni-
fying ﬁnalized hypothesis or solution through the process of reading. In this
sense it is possible to invoke Meir Sternberg’s (ibid.: ) statement about
the Bible with regard to Thru: ‘‘To make sense of the discourse is to gain a
sense of being human.’’
Without this kind of reading, Thru remains in the ‘‘transient category’’
of the ‘‘undetermined text’’ according to Brooke-Rose’s own deﬁnition of
the term.15 This is a species of text where ‘‘the reader, not being properly
encoded, is or feels free to read everything, anything, and therefore also
nothing, into the text’’ (Brooke-Rose : ). The undetermined text
is the antithesis of biblical narrative, according to Sternberg’s (: )
analysis, which may be ‘‘diﬃcult to read, easy to underread and overread
and even misread, but virtually impossible, so to speak, to counterread.’’
Brooke-Rose’s ‘‘Is Self-Reﬂexivity Mere?’’ (b) is an attempt to contra-
dict some counterreadings and underreadings and open up aspects of the
novel that have lain hidden in plain sight on the graphic surface of Thru for
a quarter of a century. However, according to Brooke-Rose (: ), such
states of incomprehension of a nondetermined text are not permanent:
An ‘‘apparent’’ non-determination of codes . . . may in some instances turn out
to be a mere contemporary blindness to an unfamiliar form of this necessary
balance, the encoded reader being as it were invisible, for a while, to the actual
reader, until later actual readers discover him; whence a lack of comprehension,
a lack of reaction, or on the contrary, sometimes, over-reaction, but for thewrong
reasons.
It has not helped Thru that initial reviews portrayed it as unreadable (see
Reyes ) and that later criticism has foregrounded it only as the epitome
of postmodernism. But perhaps now enough time has elapsed to bringThru
back into the literary fold on its own terms. As Brooke-Rose (: ) has
argued, sometimes in nondetermined texts ‘‘the apparent non-existent bal-
ance turns out to be a structured balance, in which case the text will rejoin
one of the ﬁrst two categories [over-determined, under-determined], and
keep critics happy for generations.’’ Certainly, if it can be done, there will
be as much rejoicing, by critics as well as by those readers interested in the
possibilities of literature, as there has been wailing and gnashing of teeth
over this particular text.
. In the essay ‘‘The Readerhood of Man,’’ republished as ‘‘The Encoded Reader’’ in chap-
ter  of Brooke-Rose .
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